Review of Willmott, H.P., The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War by Koch, James V.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
1-2010
Review of Willmott, H.P., The Great Crusade: A
New Complete History of the Second World War
James V. Koch
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_facpubs
Part of the Economics Commons, History Commons, and the Nonfiction Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Koch, James V., "Review of Willmott, H.P., The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War" (2010).
Economics Faculty Publications. 12.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_facpubs/12
Original Publication Citation
Koch, J. V. (2010). Review of Willmott, H.P., The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. H-Net Reviews,
1-3.
H. P. Willmott. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. Revised
edition. Dulles: Potomac Books, 2008. xiv + 505 pp. $22.00 (paper), ISBN 978-1-59797-191-1.
Reviewed by James V. Koch (Old Dominion University)
Published on H-German (January, 2010)
Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher
Debunking of Myths?
The first edition of The Great Crusade (1989) was a
fine, comprehensive, single-volume history ofWorldWar
II. The revised edition is even better, though readers
should be aware that this is a military history of the war
that usually focuses on decision-making and activities at
the operational level and above. The author sometimes
speaks of individual fighting divisions, but almost never
about individual soldiers. This work is thus not the place
for the reader to discover the tales and yarns of individual
soldiers. Those who hope to grasp what it was like to be a
Marine storming the beach at Tarawa, or a German civil-
ian in Dresden in February 1945, should look elsewhere.
H. P. Willmott gives considerable attention to the broad
political and economic motives of warring countries and
ample time to the analysis of the thinking behind major
military decisions. Nevertheless, individuals who view
history through the lens of the trinity of race, class, and
gender will also emerge disappointed. Race is considered
as it applies to the Holocaust, German and Japanese ex-
pansion, and the occupation policies of those countries.
But, class and gender hardly rate a mention. The bot-
tom line: The Great Crusade is not a social history of the
war. Similarly, Willmott makes no attempt to replicate
the anecdotes and stories that leaven the contributions of
historians such as John Keegan, or his one-time student,
Antony Beevor. His concern lies with the overall sweep
of events and their import, not with individual reactions
and stories.
Willmott does have a few axes to grind, but he can-
didly enunciates them. He is critical of the “great men”
theory of history; he believes it is important to provide
the reader with a balance of perspectives held by the ma-
jor participants and he states, “I must admit to a con-
tempt for that popularly accepted by pernicious myth of
German military excellence” (p. xi). He is not afraid to
swim against the tide, either, especially in his analysis
of the European theater. He takes issue with Gerhard
Weinberg’s view that the Russians deliberately halted on
the outskirts of Warsaw in 1944, thereby condemning
the Polish underground to destruction.[1] He argues that
more German divisions (for example, those involved in
the spring 1941 Balkans invasions) could not have been
absorbed easily in the Germans’ June 22, 1941 invasion of
the Soviet Union and hence would not have contributed
to immediate increased German combat effectiveness.
He opines that Germany’s repulse in the Battle of Britain
“had no effect upon Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet
Union in 1941” (p. 110).
The Great Crusade seldom minces words. Willmott
describes Pearl Harbor, when all things are considered, as
a Japanese defeat. In his view, the Wehrmacht was con-
sistently outfought and out-thought from Stalingrad to
the end of the war. He argues that Erich von Manstein’s
famous 1943 riposte to the Soviets at Kharkov has been
overly praised. Bernard Montgomery’s tactics often imi-
tated those of the Soviets in their reliance upon numerical
and firepower superiority. The RAF was on the edge of
defeat after its costly March 1944 Nuremberg raid. A de
facto truce between the Japanese and both Chiang Kai-
shek and Mao Xedong persisted for long periods of time
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in China. With similar bravado, the author states that
the Union’s blockade and strangling of the Confederacy
in the U.S. CivilWar is a direct analog to U.S. strategy vis-
á-vis Japan in World War II. Japan and the United States
both wished to end the war before the Soviets could en-
ter, but couldn’t get the job accomplished. Most of the
war was fought after the outcome already had been de-
termined. It is not possible to pick out a turning point in
either the war in Europe, or in the Pacific. Such views
(and there are many more) make this history both stim-
ulating and sometimes challenging.
On occasion, Willmott offers conclusions that under-
mine his own position, as when he offers the judgment
thaat the Wehrmacht exhibited “a technique, initiative
and flair at both tactical and operational levels that en-
abled German ground formations to outfight consistently
superior enemy forces–at least until 1944” (p. 136), even
as he argues that German military excellence is a “per-
nicious myth” (p. xi). Apparently he discounts the work
of Trevor N. DuPuy and others, which suggests that the
typical German infantryman was approximately 25 per-
cent more effective than the comparable British or Amer-
ican.[2] An apparent contradiction also emerges between
his derogation of the “great men” thesis and his observa-
tion that “the European war outlasted its author by nine
days” (p. 449).
Given Willmott’s thesis concerning the absence of
real turning points in the war, it is not surprising that his
coverage of critical battles such as Moscow, Pearl Har-
bor, Midway, and Kiev is lighter than one sees in other
comprehensive histories. He also asserts that economic
strength ultimately was the critical factor in deciding the
war, but does not even mention the work of Mark Harri-
son or Adam Tooze in his bibliography.[3]
Given these decided stances and the problems that
some readers may find with them, we should ask what
the work does accomplish especially well. First, Willmott
makes one think and rethink one’s views about what re-
ally happened in the war and why events occurred as
they did. Second, drawing on the pathbreaking work of
David M. Glantz and others, he gives significant atten-
tion to Soviet war thinking and Soviet military matura-
tion over the duration of the war. His is not the Ger-
manocentric view of events that frequently has colored
histories of World War II. Third, he does supply “critical
balance” (p. xi) to the perspectives of the combatants.
Fourth, he elucidates important, but otherwise obscure,
events such as the compromising capture of the SS Au-
tomedon in November 1941 and the prophetic Total War
Research Institute study of August 1941 performed by the
Japanese. Fifth, Willmott often buttresses his conclusions
with generous data, more so than any comparable com-
prehensive history. Sixth, depending upon their tastes, of
course, readers may find attractive his penchant for stat-
ing his assessments forthrightly. He seldom hedges his
conclusions with probabilistic statements or counterfac-
tual possibilities. By contrast, in his well-received 1,178-
page history of the war, Weinberg sometimes proffers the
view that more research is needed on a topic before we
can reach a definitive conclusion.
I recommend The Great Escape as a university text-
book and I back this judgment by using it as my primary
text when I teach a course on the history of World War
II. True, Willmott serves up more than a few controver-
sial points of view and he chooses not to cover several
critical topics. Nevertheless, the book is highly readable,
well documented, and provides an excellent springboard
for discussion. Would that more prospective textbooks
were able to fulfill the same criteria.
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